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An Economic Analysis of Factor Usage 
and Workplace Regulation: Comment* 
I. Introduction 
In a recent article in this Journal, Elder [I] examines the impact of workplace safety regula­
tions upon a firm's input choices. His theoretical model, which treats accidents in the work­
place as a by-product of production, shows that increases in safety are obtained at the expense 
of reduced output and altered factor usage. The results are empirically supported using state 
by state data for 1971 and 1976 where factor usage is regressed on factor returns and 
workers' compensation payments. When combined with work by Russell [2] and Viscusi [3] 
showing rather small benefits from safety regulation, Elder's work raises important ques­
tions about the social desirability of workplace regulation as implemented in the U.S. 
We agree with Elder's general conclusions, but we find that the derivation of his 
theoretical results contain some errors. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine Elder's 
model and to illustrate how his theoretical model should have been developed. 
II. Reexamination of the Model 
Following Elder, we consider the case of a competitive firm that employs labor and capital 
to produce its output. The objective function of the profit maximizing firm can be defined by 
max rr =pX(K,L)- CaL- rK- wL- bSL, (I) 
where rr = profit, x =output, p =output price, K =capital, L =labor, a =accident rate, 
C = cost per accident, w = wage rate, r = capital return rate, b = price of safety, and 
S = safety expenditures. Accidents, A = aL, are modeled as a by-product of production, 
depending upon labor usage and the accident rate. 1 They are treated as a cost of production 
that can be reduced through safety expenditures. Hence, assume that: (i) a = a (S), a' = 
(da/dS) < 0, a"= (d 2afdS2 ) > 0; and (ii) w = w(a), w' = (dwjda) > 0, and w" = 
(d 2 w/ da 2 ) = 0. The assumption w" = 0 is implicit in Elder's analysis. It can be relaxed so 
that w" > 0 without affecting any of the qualitative results. 2 Intuitively, w > 0 seems likely 
since an increasing rate of accidents should increase workers' perceptions of risk. 
*We would hke to thank Otis Gilley for helpful discusswns and comments and an anonymous referee for valuable 
suggestions. 
I. In his footnote 3, Elder mentions that this problem could also be modeled in a joint production framework, 
which is, "in fact, more intuitively appealing." Alternatively, the problem could be examined using a three-factor model 
where safety is the third factor of production. Elder's basic results would remain the same, but we feel this may be a more 
descriptive way of modeling the problem, especially since Elder already implicitly assumes the existence of safety as a 
factor of production. 
2. Elder does not mention that w" = 0. However, his equation (7) implies this important assumption. Even if w" < 
0, sufficient conditions are met if a"(C + w') >- (a') 2 w". 
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A necessary consequence of the profit maximization problem is that the first order 
partial derivatives of (I) equal zero, 
arrjaK = pXK- r = 0. (2) 
arrjaL = pXL- Ca- w(a)- bS = 0 (3) 
arr;as =- a'CL- a'w'L- bL = -L[a'(C+w') + b] = 0. (4) 
Notice that our equation ( 4) differs from Elder's specification which reads as arrIas = 
-CLa'- L(w'fa') = 0 [1, 317, eq. (4)]. 
Assuming that the production function, X = X (K, L), is strictly concave implies that 
the second order derivatives satisfy XKK < 0, XLL < 0, and (XKKXLL - x;L) > 0. 3 Suffi­
cient conditions also require that the second order partial derivatives satisfy rr;; < 0, for i = 
K, L, S.4 Then, the first order conditions can be solved for the optimal levels of factor usage, 
K = K(C,r,b,p), L = L(C,r,b,p) and S = S(C,r,b,p). 5 
We next examine the effect of changes in worker's compensation payments, as approxi­
mated by C, on factor usage. The first order conditions are totally differentiated and 
Cramer's rule is used to solve for aKj ac, aLj ac and as; ac as follows: 
aKjaC =- aXKLf[p(XKKXLL-x;L)] (5) 
aLjaC = aXKKf[p(XKKXLL-X;L)] (6) 
as;ac =- a'/[a"(C+w')+(a') 2w"] (7) 
where p(XKKXLL-x;L) > 0 and [a"(C+w')+(a') 2 w"] > 0 for profit maximization. As­
suming that capital and labor are complementary, i.e., XKL > 0, from (5), we obtain 
aKj ac < 0.6 Furthermore, from (6) and (7), we obtain aLj ac < 0, as; ac > 0. In other 
words, an increase in worker's compensation will increase safety investment and decrease 
the use of both capital and labor. Elder obtains this result by assuming that w" = 0. We find 
the same result occurs in the more general case w" > 0. 
If safety regulation is introduced (as a binding constraint), the regulated level of safety 
investment (SR) exceeds the optimal level of safety investment (S*). Compliance with regu­
lations is assumed so that 
S= SR. (8) 
The objective function of the regulated firm becomes 
max rr = pX(K,L)- CaL- rK- wL- bSRL (9) 
and the first order conditions are 
arrjaK=pXK-r=O (10) 
arrj aL =pXL- Ca- w(a)- bSR = 0. (11) 
3. Elder assumes that capital and labor are complementary factors, so that X KL > 0. 
4. The second order sufficient conditions are rrKK = pXKK• rrKL = pXKL• rrKs = rrsK = 0, rrLK =rrKL• rru = 
pXLL, rrLs =- [a'(C+w')+b], rrsL = rrLs. and rrss =- L[a"(C+w') + (a') 2w"]. 
5. Note that optimal levels of K, LandS are not a function of w. w is already endogenous, w = w (a(S)). 
6. There is an error in Elder's equation (5). It should be read as our equation (5). The initial minus was omitted in 
Elder's paper. 
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These first order conditions differ from (2)- (4) in that SR replaces S, which is no longer a 
choice variable. 
Since the production function is strictly concave, the second order sufficient conditions 
are met. Hence, equations (10) and (11) can be solved for K = K(SR, C,r,p,b), L = 
L(SR, C,r,p,b). 
Totally differentiating ( 10) and ( 11) and using Cramer's rule gives 
aK;asR =(If H)pVXKL (12) 
aL;asR =- (1/ H)pVXKK (13) 
where H = p 2(XKKXLL-X'I.d > 0 and V = -(Ca' + w'a' + b). 7 Since H > 0, p > 0, 
XKL > 0, and XKK < 0, the sign of aKj asR and aL; asR is determined by the sign of V. 8 
According to Elder, 
It can be shown that V> 0 by considering equation (4), [i.e., BrriBS =- CL(dalds)­
L [ ( dw Ida) I (da Ids)} - bL = 0], which determines S *. When safety is unregulated, ( 4) 
holds and V = 0 (since dividing both sides of (4) by L yields Jl). When safety is regulated 
(SR > S*), (4) does not hold and V =0. The latter implies that dal dSR > dal dS* and b < 
- C (dal dSR) - (dwl da)(dal dSR). Thus V > 0 [1, 319, footnote 10; bracket is added]. 
If V > 0, equations (12) and (13) imply that aKj aSR and aLj aSR > 0, contradicting 
Elder's basic behavioral proposition and empirical findings. However, using the model that 
we have developed, it can be shown that V < 0. 
From equation (4) in the unregulated case, we note that V = rrsf L =(Ca' + w'a' +b), 
so that V = 0 at the optimal level of safety, S*. Under binding regulation SR > S* and 
a(S*) > a(SR), which means there are less accidents under regulation. Since a'(S) < 0 and 
a"(S) > 0, a'(SR) > a'(S*). Both a'(SR) and a'(S*) are negative numbers, so that in terms 
of magnitude, a'(S*) > a'(SR). This implies that accident reduction from the last dollar 
spent on safety is smaller in the regulated case. Similarly, w' > 0 and w" > 0 imply that 
w'(a(SR)) > w'(a(S*)), or that reductions in the wage rate from each additional dollar 
spent on safety are smaller in the regulated case. 
Under safety regulation, 
and in absence of regulation 
V = V* =- {Ca'(S*) + [w'(a(S*))][a'(S*)] + b} = 0. 
Assuming b is constant, 
VR- V* = C[a'(S*)- a'(SR)] + [w'(a(S*))][a'(S*)]- [w'(a(SR))][a'(SR)] 
is negative since a'(SR) > a'(S*) and w'(a(SR)) > w'(a(S*)). Hence, V R < 0, and the firm 
reduces output and factor employment when faced with workplace safety regulation. 
7. Note that V = rrsL = rrLS• as obtained from the second order conditions. Equivalently, V = rrs/ L. 
8. In Elder's equation ( 12), the minus sign should be omitted. On the other hand, a minus sign should be added to 
equation (13). 
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III. Conclusion 
We have illustrated how Elder's theoretical model of the effects of safety regulation should 
have developed. In Elder's paper, the intuitively correct results were obtained through a 
series of offsetting errors. Our respecification simply strengthens Elder's theoretical and 
empirical results. We believe that alternative specifications of the model (such as, consider­
ing joint production, or explicitly including safety as a factor input in production) would 
produce qualitatively similar results. In the empirical section, Elder has employed CES cost 
functions instead of a more flexible functional form. Relaxing this assumption could affect 
measured values of the elasticity of substitution of K and L between periods, however, the 
conclusion that safety affects factor choices and reduces output would remain unaltered. 
Dennis 0. Olson 
Yeung-Nan Shieh 
University ofAlaska - Fairbanks 
Fairbanks, Alaska 
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